

VZCZCXRO9549  
RR RUEHMA RUEHROV  
DE RUEHNJ #1037/01 2261036  
ZNR UUUUU ZZH  
R 141036Z AUG 06  
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4202  
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE  
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1246  
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA 0175  
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0729  
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1225  
RUEHKKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0305  
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1517  
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2785  
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1926  
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0290  
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1316  
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS  
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0867  
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0806

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 001037

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DEPARTMENT FOR AF, D, DRL, PRM; LONDON AND PARIS FOR  
AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL

E.O. 12958: N/A

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SUBJECT: CHAD: FOREIGN MINISTER ON SUDAN, DARFUR, AND  
POLITICS

REF: STATE 1244

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¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The long-term success of the recent rapprochement between Khartoum and N'Djamena will hinge on the good will of the countries' respective leaders, according to Chad's Foreign Minister. He not only denied accusations of Chad's support for Sudanese rebel movements, but accused the international community of ignoring the positive role that Chad had played in past mediation efforts between the Sudanese government and the Darfur rebels. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (SBU) On August 12, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmad Allam-mi met with Ambassador Wall to discuss Chad's recent diplomatic maneuverings. Allam-mi's comments on Chad's opening of diplomatic relations with Chad are reported in septel.

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CHAD-SUDAN RELATIONS POSITIVE, FOR THE MOMENT  
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¶3. (SBU) Allam-mi told the Ambassador that the recent rapprochement with Sudan was based on the premise that strained relations with Khartoum would only further destabilize Chad. Both parties had "poured oil into the fire," as Allam-mi put it, and the rupture in diplomatic ties was only bringing greater insecurity to the region. In order to ensure that relations between both sides would continue to improve, President Deby and President El-Bashir needed to demonstrate the good will to commit to positive relations. Chad, according to Allam-mi, was prepared to make this commitment. The question was now whether Sudan, which continued to harbor a Chadian rebel movement in Sudan, would cease its support for opponents of the Deby regime.

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WE DO NOT SUPPORT SUDANESE REBELS  
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14. (SBU) The Ambassador turned to Darfur, and discussed reftel points with Allam-mi. He pointed out that any Chadians who supported Sudanese rebel movement in Darfur and undermined the Darfur Peace Accords would become the potential target of U.S.-supported United Nations sanctions. The Foreign Minister was quick to deny any accusations of explicit Chadian support of Sudanese rebels who opposed the Darfur peace accords. He admitted that the Chadian authorities were in contact with the G-19 Sudanese rebels operating in Darfur, but the communications was merely to gather information on the situation on the ground. He also admitted that certain members of the GOC had reservations about the DPA, and had argued that support for Sudanese rebels might act as a counterweight against Sudan. But the GOC was currently unified in its belief that peace in Darfur, not the destabilization of Sudan, was in Chad's interests.

15. (SBU) The Foreign Minister identified the Justice and Equality Movement and its leader, Dr. Khalil Ibrahim, as a major reason for the perceptions of Chadian support for Sudanese rebel movements. According to Allam-mi, Khalil and the JEM were purchasing equipment and support from defecting Chadian soldiers for their cause. He cited an example of a recent Chadian military vehicle purchase (later transported to Darfur) by JEM loyalists from a Chadian military officer. While the GOC did not tolerate such actions by its military officers, it was very difficult to control such behavior. After all, the tribal and ethnic connections among the Sudanese rebels and elements in the Chadian military meant that military officers might independently supply weapons to the rebel movements, but these actions were not part of a government policy.

16. (SBU) Allam-mi was highly critical of the international NDJAMENA 00001037 002.2 OF 002

community's treatment of Chad. He stated that the international community, which was now considering sanctions on members of the GOC, was supporting Minni Minawi, who himself was undermining the N'Djamena cease-fire agreement and the DPA by initiating attacks on other members of the Sudanese rebel movement and committing atrocities against civilians. He said that the international community had forgotten the positive role that Chad had played in mediation efforts between the GOS and the Sudanese rebel movement, both trying to bring the parties to the negotiating table and assisting in unifying the rebel movement in preparation for the Abuja talks. These mediation efforts, according to Allam-mi, were ignored by the rest of the world; and as a result of Chad's diplomatic intervention in the Darfur crisis, its relations with Sudan began to deteriorate. Chad, in Allam-mi words, would not "play the game of the international community" when it came to Darfur.

17. (SBU) When the Ambassador asked if Chad's recent rapprochement with Sudan would mean that Chad would continue to support the deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping force in Darfur and Eastern Chad, Allam-mi said while Chad continued to support the formation of such a force, it would have to assess how its support of a U.N. force impacted its relations with the GOS.

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POLITICAL DIALOGUE CANNOT INVOLVE CHADIAN REBELS  
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18. (SBU) While noting that his area was foreign affairs, not domestic politics, Allam-mi addressed the issue of a national dialogue in Chad. He asserted that a political dialogue cannot include members of the armed opposition. The Chadian rebels did not represent the national interests, but rather tribal interests and rivalries, and therefore would not be accepted into any national forum for reconciliation until they agreed to disarm and join the political process. When the Ambassador asked about Allam-mi's contacts with

representatives of the armed opposition in Paris, the foreign minister said that he had had no significant contacts with Chadian rebels when in the French capital.

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COMMENT  
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¶9. (SBU) Recent diplomatic efforts at reconciliation between N'Djamena and Khartoum is a positive development for both countries and the region. However, any future attacks by Chadian rebels into Chad could easily restart the blame game between the two governments. We will continue to discuss reftel points with other members of the Chadian government.

¶10. (U) Tripoli minimized considered.  
WALL